Introduction
In the numerical calculations that followed Mirrlees's (1971) pioneering contribution marginal tax rates decrease with income for the vast majority of the population. This picture is at odds with observed patterns in most countries. There are, however, in the optimal income tax literature some counter examples. Kanbur-Tuomala (1994) show that increases in inherent inequality can alter the qualitative pattern of optimal marginal tax rates. The optimal graduation can indeed be such that marginal tax rates increase for the majority of the population, but there continues to exist a significant income range at the top where marginal tax rates decline. Diamond (1998) 
assumes a
Pareto distribution of skills rather than the lognormal distribution that Mirrlees and other have assumed. Using quasi-linear preferences he finds rising marginal tax rates on those above the modal skill level to be optimal 1 .
2
Should we then conclude that the existing optimal non-linear income tax literature does not provide support for the progressive marginal tax rates? We think it is premature to reach this conclusion
There are still unexplored questions in the standard non-linear continuum model. Although the numerical simulations that followed Mirrlees (1971) have tried many variations on his basic parametrization, it is slightly surprising to notice that essentially only two utility functions -a
Cobb-Douglas and a CES with the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure being 0.5-are employed in these simulations. In particular, the role of the assumed form of utility of 1 Progressive marginal rates may be optimal under non-standard assumptions e.g when people care about relative levels of consumption (Tuomala,1990) , when there is significant wage uncertainty (Tuomala, 1990, Low and Maldoom,2002) , and when earnings are allowed to be less than perfectly correlated with productivity (Bevan,2002) .
consumption in determining the shape of the tax schedule is not clear. Dahan-Strawczynski (2000) show, however, that a rising marginal tax rates at high incomes presented by Diamond (1998) depend on the assumption of utility of consumption. Their simulations focus only on high levels of income, not the whole schedule. It is our aim to show numerically how sensitive marginal tax rate structure is to the assumed form of utility of consumption. We replace the assumptions of utility of consumption used in previous simulations to quadratic utility of consumption. This form is essentially less curvature than those used in previous simulations.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we set up the basic Mirrlees (1971) model and highlight the role of the underlying factors in determining the shape of optimal non-linear tax schedule. However, analytical characterisation does not lead far. In section 4 using numerical simulations we study the role of the assumed utility of consumption in determining the pattern of optimal non-linear taxation. Section 4 concludes.
The Mirrlees model
It useful to lay out the basic model, even though it is well-known. There is a continuum of individuals, each having the same preference ordering, which is represented by an additive utility function defined over consumption x and hours worked y, with
x > 0 and V y < 0 (subscripts indicating partial derivatives) and where V(.) is convex. Workers differ only in the pre-tax wage n they can earn. There is a distribution of n on the interval (s,h) represented by the density function f(n).Gross income z = ny.
Suppose that the aim of policy can be expressed as maximizing the following social welfare criterion 2 Boadway et al (2000) provide a full characterization of the solution when preferences are quasi-linear in leisure. ,
where W(.) is an increasing and concave function of utility. The government cannot observe individuals' productivities and thus is restricted to setting taxes and transfers as a function only of earnings, T[z(n)].
The government maximizes S subject to the revenue constraint
where in the Mirrlees tradition R is interpreted as the required revenue for essential public goods. The more non-tax revenue a government receives from external sources, the lower is R. In addition to the revenue constraint, the government faces incentive compatibility constraints. These in turn state that each n individual maximizes utility by choice of hour.
Totally differentiating utility with respect to n, and making use of workers utility maximization condition, we obtain the incentive compatibility constraints,
exposition see Tuomala ,1990) , the first order conditions of this problem imply a pattern of marginal
where λ is the multiplier on the revenue constraint and
is the multiplier on the incentive compatibility constraint. This latter satisfies the transversality conditions .
(6).
As in Atkinson-Stiglitz (1980) e . It is the elasticity of labour supply with respect to net wage, holding marginal utility of income constant, i.e. e is "compensated" wage elasticity in rather unusual sense.
It should be clear from (4) and (5) that the variation of the optimal marginal tax rate with the level of income is a complex matter.
5 6 To see the complications that arise, consider equations (4) and (5). 4 There are other papers that have looked at alternative derivations and formulae for non-linear taxation, see Revesz (1989) , Roberts (2000) and Saez (2001) 5 Equations (4) -(6) lead to the few qualitative conclusions available in this framework (see Tuomala, 1990) . It can be shown that the marginal tax rate on income is nonnegative. This is more striking than it at first looks. It may very well be optimal to have the average tax rate less than zero, but it is never optimal to subsidize earnings at margin. An intuition is that it is cheaper to get people to given indifference curve by reducing average rate rather than by exacerbating deadweight loss through distorting their labour supply decisions. It can also be shown that the marginal tax rate is less than one. We also have the famous "end point" results. If wage distribution is bounded above, then the marginal tax rates at the top is zero. If it is optimal for least able individual to work then the marginal tax rate on least able is zero. An intuition behind these endpoint results is that only reason to have a marginal tax rate differing from zero is to raise an average tax rate above that point and lower it below i.e. equity considerations. But at the top is no one to take from and at the bottom there is no one to give to. So at the end points only efficiency considerations matter. Numerical solutions (Tuomala, 1984) have shown, however, that these results have very little practical relevance.
First, the term (1+e -1 ), reflecting also conventional wisdom, (4) says that, other things equal, the marginal tax rate should be lower the larger is the compensated elasticity of labour supply, e. Governments fearing that disincentive effects are large will tend to set lower marginal rates. The term, U x , denotes the marginal utility of consumption representing income effects. It also appears in the third term, µ(n), that incorporates distributional concerns. Hence it is obvious that the functional form of U x has the important role in determining the shape of the schedule. The fourth term, nf(n), in turn is an indicator of the extent of earnings at the wage level n. Equation (4) also suggests that, other things equal, the marginal tax rate should be lower the denser the population at that point, i.e. higher f(n). In other words the more people affected, the higher is deadweight loss. On the other hand for the typical distribution the density weighted by n, (eg. lognormal distribution) is likely to decline with n above some point suggesting a higher marginal tax rate on high earners. The term µ(n) in turn increases with n for low n and decreases with n for high n. The turning point depends on λ 7 . The lower is λ, the higher is the n at which the turning point occurs. Thus as the revenue requirement falls, and hence λ falls, the range over which µ(n) is increasing stretches further. Since µ(n) affects the marginal tax rate positively, this means that the range over which the latter increases also stretches further -at least for this reason. In this sense, therefore, more tax revenue leads to a less progressive tax structure.
But this is about as far as we can get at this level of generality 8 . Of course, following studies e.g Atkinson (1995) , Diamond (1998) and Dahan and Strawczynski (2000) we can assume income effects away. Then it is possible to deduce on the basis of (4) that with Pareto and lognormal distributions marginal tax rates rise with income at high levels of income. Once we assume income effects this not any more possible. A concave utility of consumption means that income effects are weaker for high income earners which pushes marginal tax rates down at high levels of income. On the other hand when U x decreases with n its impact on inequality aversion pushes in an opposite . 7 It can be shown that the left hand side of (5) is decreasing in n* (n* is the skill level at which W'(u(n*))U x [x(n*)]=λ) so long as W(u) is concave and leisure is normal.
direction. The interaction of these two forces determines the optimal tax rate schedule. In the tradition of the non-linear taxation literature, we can provide better understanding of the form of optimal policy through numerical simulations. We can compute post tax income at each level of n, and thus calculate inequality of pre and post tax income as well as total income, for different values of key parameters. The next section takes up this task.
Model calibration and numerical results
Following the lead of Mirrlees (1971) numerical calculations have proved useful in generating useful results 9 . We follow this route here. We assume n to be distributed lognormally with parameters m and σ (see Atichison and Brown, 1957) . This assumption is common in the literature, following Mirrlees (1971) . For numerical simulations we choose σ = 0.39, 0.5 and 0.7 as a standard deviation of n and mean n = 0.4. Preferences over consumption and working time are given by the following utility function that is quadratic in consumption (quadratic approximation)
The previous simulations (see Tuomala, 1990 , Kanbur-Tuomala 1994 ) have used either the logarithmic utility of consumption or U(x)=-1/x. The utility of consumption in (7) is a kind of "mixture" of these two forms. As displayed in Figure 1 the utility of consumption in (7) is essentially less curvature than those used in the previous simulations.
8 There are also a number of asymptotic results for the unbounded case in Mirrlees (1971) 9 Tuomala (1984 Tuomala ( , 1990 gives details of the computational procedure. Figure 1 The social welfare function of the recipient government is specified as of ß = 0, we define W = u). R=1 is specified as a fraction of national income, and is assumed to be 0.0 (pure redistributive) and 0.1.
The Tables 1-4 give labour supply, y, gross income, z, net income, x and optimal average (ATR) and marginal tax rates (MTR) at various percentiles of the ability distribution. Tables also provide the decile ratio (P90/P10) for net income and gross income. Unlike the scalar inequality measures the use of fractile measures such as the decile ratio allows us to consider changes in inequality at various different points in the distribution. Since marginal tax rates may be a poor indication of the redistribution powers of an optimal tax structure we measure the extent of redistribution, denoted by 10 Stern (1986) discusses the quadratic specification and other alternatives. In fact in the recent empirical labour supply studies, see Blundell et al (1999) and Keane and Moffitt (2001) , preferences over working time and net income are for disposable income, x. given by the utility function that is quadratic in hours and net income. 
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The striking thing in the numerical results shown in Tables 1-4 is that once we assume that preferences are given by the utility function that is quadratic in consumption, the shape of optimum tax schedules
Conclusions
Based on numerical simulations there seems to be a kind of consensus in the optimal tax literature that the marginal tax rate should fall rather than rise with income. Retaining the same formal structure as in Mirrlees (1971) this paper shows that this consensus is sensitive to a choice of the assumed form of utility of consumption. For the utility function quadratic in consumption optimum tax schedule look rather like those traditionally chosen by governments, i.e. the marginal tax rates rise with income.
Although it is not usual to find support in the optimal income tax literature for progressive marginal tax rates, our study offers some support to defenders of graduated rates 11 . It is also interesting to note that the marginal rates at the bottom are low and the differences between lowest and highest rates are rather big.
11 Zelenak and Moreland (1999) provide a very interesting discussion on this question.
